Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Speaker’s meaning: is an expression (originally by J. Paul Grice, “Utterer's Meaning and Intention”. In The Philosophical Review, Bd. 78 (1969) 2, pp. 147–177.) for what a speaker means with an utterance or an action in contrast to the listener's meaning. It may happen that the speaker's meaning, can only be opened up from the circumstances of the exterior. See also to mean, speech acts, conventions, interpretation, intentions, action, communication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Speaker Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
VI 179 Example: KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): we need a differentiation between speaker reference/semantic reference: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic reference can go to something other than what he is talking about. >Speaker reference, >Referene, >Donnellan, >KripkeVsDonnellan. VI 179/180 Searle: but that is not quite correct: for example "The King"/"The Usurper": the speaker does not even have to think that the object fulfills the description. >Description. Kripke: in a given idiolect, the semantic reference (without indexical components) is determined by a general intention of the speaker. The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention. Semantic reference/speaker reference/Kripke: in the case of an error both can vary. Idiolect/Kripke: here the semantic relation is determined by a general intention, the speaker reference is determined by a specific intention of the speaker. >Idiolect. SearleVsKripke: if I have both general and specific intention, then I have no general statements with respect to descriptions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Speaker Meaning
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27